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CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO RULE 24(f)(l)(C)
I hereby certify that the Brief of Appellant contains less than 10 pages and less than
1876 words, including headings, footnotes, and quotations, but excluding parts of the
Table of Contents, Table of Authorities, and the Addendum.
I have relied upon the word count of the word processing system, Microsoft Word,
used to prepare this brief. The font used is Times New Roman, 13 point.
Certified this July 23, 2018

Dated July 23, 2018
Roger Bryner
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Argument

Defendant and Appealee state that Your Appellant Roger Bryner did not meet his
burden·of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the Utah State Record's
Committee has a compelling public interest in not colluding in secret with those who
appear before it. To the contrary, the appearance of partiality is a compelling public
interest. The State Record's Committee in it's Answers and public representations claims
to be impartial and not aligned with the government bodies appearing in front of it. This
reason alone is sufficient to order disclosure of it's communications with those
government entities who appear before it. The Record's Committee attempts to misdirect
the issue of communications by stating that the SRC was itself communicating with it's
attorney. The emails in question were not from anyone in the SRC, they were from and
to the Clearfield City Attorney. Had they been to and from SRC members, then of course
they are privileged. The statement itself seeks to conflate membership in a government
body in the State of Utah with membership in the SRC, which is on it's face improper.
This is not an abuse of discretion decision. There was no discretion in the District
court decision on Summary disposition to speculate what the evidence might have been.
Had the district court actually conducted an in-camera review of the redacted portions of
the emails, then discretion might have been implicated if not for summary disposition
precluding it. The speculation as to the possible contents in the final ruling is an issue of
law, not fact and not a mixed issue, thus is not subject to the abuse of discretion standard.
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"We review the trial court's summary judgment for correctness, considering only whether
the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of
material fact existed." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 'fI 10, 48 P.3d 235. as quoted
by Pepperwood v. Mitchell, 215 UT App 137 at <JI5.
The Court of Appeals can not in good conscious affirm the statement of law by the
court at R. 372 that "The ability of the AGO to do so (provide effective legal
representation) would be severely undermined if it's communications with ... codefendants were not protected by attorney client privilege and/or the work product
privilege." To do so would allow the AGO to assert privilege with regard to any
communication with any co-defendant without any limits. This overbroad conclusion of
law alone should result in reversal of the opinion of the Trial Court.
The argument that a proper classification was conducted by the City is spurious.
The task of the District Court in conducting a GRAMA review is to de-novo classify the
records, not speculate as to the content of the records and make overbroad conclusions.
There was no actual classification of the documents, there were redactions that were
ignored by the Trial court and the actual documents were never classified by the Trial
Court, either properly or improperly.
If speculation is allowed, then one would be free to speculate that the redacted

portions of the emails contained threats of violence through illegal selective police action
against Your Appellant. Threats of violence are never privileged. While it is perhaps
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true that this is not the case, it demonstrates the absurdity of the court speculating what
the contents of the emails were in classifying them. The contents of the emails that were
redacted are a disputed issue of material fact under Summary Disposition, and GRAMA
allows resolving this issue by review of redacted copies. No other method can also
satisfy the public interest factors in GRAMA.
Defendant and Appeallee misrepresents the record in the Trial Court by stating
that the trial court did not consider the order of Judge Allphin in reaching it's decision.
This is false, as the court at R. 372 in the footnote clearly references the earlier order at
R. 284, and states that the documents of Your Appellant were stricken and no response

was required to them. This prevented the in-camera review of redacted emails, and the
production of a redaction log, and even the specification of what the exact common
interest with Clearfield City was. The discovery that was stricken was a single question
to the AGO, asking what the common interest with Clearfield was. The Trial Court only
speculates as to the interest, there is no admissible evidence in either summary
disposition motion as to the actual common interest.
As I agued before in my brief, if the Trial Court made no determination as to me
prevailing in the case prior to imposing that sanction. That determination is expressly
required by Rule 83.

In fact, in the record of this case in both Judge Allphin's order and

in the order of the Trial Court, there is no required determination under Rule 83. This
alone should render it void. There is no permissive language in Rule 83 allowing
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skipping the step of analyzing if the person to be sanctioned might prevail or has already
prevailed. Applicable case law, to the extent it has so far developed, strongly supports
this "the court cannot impose a vexatious litigant order on a prose litigant whose claim
before that court enjoys a reasonable probability of success." Strand v. Newpetco 397
P.3d 724 at 'fl2. Should the court reverse the trial court, then I would argue that this is for
all intents and purposes a statement that Your Appellant enjoys a reasonable probability
of success. Thus vexatious litigant sanctions may not be imposed by the Trial Court, and
the Trial Court would likewise be prohibited from imposing sanctions in this case.
In addition the underlying case was filed before Judge Allphin's order. That
should render him unable to have any Jurisdiction over this case. To allow some
Jurisdiction for imposing vexatious litigant orders but not other jurisdiction to challenge
that order is pure hypocrisy. If the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to consider the
application of Judge Allphin' s order in this case, then the Trial Court should not have
considered it either. To hold any other conclusion makes the right of appeal meaningless.
In fact it may be correct to remove jurisdiction entirely, under Rule 83 and the provisions
requiring a finding regarding probability of prevailing. It can not be correct to simply
ignore the issue of complete and total denial of access to the courts to a person who can't
afford to hire an attorney and who can't find one willing to represent him at any price.
Finally there can be no direct appeal of Judge Allphin's order. That appeal is
blocked, and remains blocked, by the machinations of the Courts of Utah. An appeal of
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Judge Allphin's order was denied based upon it not being final. This is despite the fact
that a remand order was entered prior to Judge Allphin's order, remanding that case back
to the State Record's Committee. The Court of Appeals in case #20160870 ruled that the
rd

3 district court in case #160903793 had jurisdiction over the subsequent ruling of the
State Record's Committee. (see Exhibit A, unpublished decision from that Appeals case)
A review of the docket in case #160903793 at entry #46 and after shows that it has no
final order entered after the Appellate decision of 12-8-2016. While the case has a
clerical error dismissing the case on 5-30-2016 6 days after remand from the Utah
Supreme Court, there is no actual order in that case dismissing it only the Court of
Appeals order overturning the dismissal.
Conclusion

I ask that the court of Appeals reverse the decisions dismissing Paul Tonks and
granting summary disposition against the plaintiff, and to grant whatever relief is just and
proper including but not limited to any of the following:
1) Rule that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the confidential
nature of the communications, and order an in-camera review.
2) Rule that there is insufficient findings regarding the attorney client and joint
interest relationship between Paul Tonks, as an attorney and any potential clients or joint
parties in interest or in the alternative rule there is no privilege based upon public interest.
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3) Rule that there is no plausible attorney or client relationship between Stuart
Williams, counsel for Clearfield City, and Paul Tonks, counsel for the SRC and order the
communication from Stuart Williams to Paul Tonks disclosed.
4) Rule that there is a public interest in the Utah State Record's committee
remaining impartial and not having a confidential joint interest with any party appearing
before it, including but not limited to Clearfield City.
5) Rule that the public interest in impartiality of the Utah State Record's
committee necessitates disclosure of all of the emails.
6) Rule that the order of Judge Allphin can not be applied to this case as Allphin' s
order violates Article 1 section 11 of the Utah Constitution and Judge Allphin lacks
jurisdiction to enter any order in the trial court in this case.
7) Rule that as the order of Judge Allphin is not reviewable as a final order as a
mater of right, and a person can not perpetually waive their rights to access the courts by
any inaction, that it must be reviewed after being applied in each new case.
8) Rule that as neither the Judge in this case, nor Judge Allphin, made any
determination regarding "prevailing" as required by Rule 83, that it was improper to
impose any vexatious litigant sanctions whatsoever as that is a violation of Rule 83 and
Strand v. Newpetco 397 P.3d 724 at <J{2.

Dated July 23, 2018
Roger Bryner
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Certificate of mailing
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on July 23, 2018 I did cause this to be delivered by email to:
LONNY J. PEHRSON (#09773)
jJ .
/-f..._ _,,,., 1 - - Counsel for Defendants
./ ~ ~
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140860
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0860
lpehrson@utah.gov
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FILr~
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 08 2016

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
--00000--

ROGER BRYNER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

Defendants and Appellees.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER OF SUMMARY
REVERSAL
Case No. 20160870-CA

Before Judges Orme, Christiansen, and Mortensen.
Roger Bryner appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition for judicial
review of a Records Committee order for lack of jurisdiction. This is before the court on
Bryner' s motion for summary reversal and the Records Committee's motion for
summary dismissal.
The Records Committee moved to dismiss in the trial court under rule 12(b)(l) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to hear a case. 'A
court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the court has
been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court
derives its authority."' State v. Smith, 2014 UT 33, «j[ 18 (quoting Myers v. State, 2004 UT
31, <J[ 16). District courts have subject matter jurisdiction to review Records Committee
decisions under Utah Code section 63G-2-404. Bryner' s petition for review was timely
filed under the statute. Accordingly, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Bryner' s appeal.
The Records Committee argued that an ongoing proceeding in the Second
District Court deprived the Third District Court of jurisdiction to consider the current
case. However, the parallel proceeding in the Second District does not defeat subject
matter jurisdiction. The filing of the petition for review met the requirements to invoke
the Third District Court's jurisdiction over the case. The Second District Court's
retention of jurisdiction over the underlying matter presents a valid and compelling
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reason to seek consolidation of the cases pursuant to rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, but it does not affect the statutory authority of the Third District Court to
consider Bryner' s petition for judicial review.
The Records Committee also moved for summary disposition in this court and
argued that this court lacks jurisdiction because Bryner' s appeal is a collateral attack on
a prior order. Although Bryner may cast a wide net in his arguments, the scope of this
appeal is narrow. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing
the underlying petition for review based on lack of jurisdiction. This court has
jurisdiction to review the trial court's order. Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Records Committee's motion for summary
dismissal is denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial court's order dismissing
the petition for review based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reversed, and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this ~ a y of December, 2016.

FOR THE COURT:

20160870-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 8, 2016, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or was sent by electronic mail to be
delivered to:
ROGER BRYNER
roger.bryner@yahoo.com
BRENT A BURNETT
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL
brentbumett@utah.gov
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: JULIE RIGBY AND CHERYL AIONO
cheryla@utcourts.gov, julier@utcourts.gov

By

I~

oaci'Alzda1Mku

Ashley Dovidauskas
Judicial Assistant
Case No. 20160870
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 160903793
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